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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER AND SUGGESTIONS IN SUPPORT
Michael P. Hutchings,
) Circuit Court No.Cr 495-338 Mx
) Court of Appeals No. 21211-1
) Supreme Court No. _________
Lee Allen Martin, Pro
COMES NOW the defendant/appellant
Lee Allen Martin, pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 30.27 and
83.03 does hereby request of this honorable court that a transfer be
granted to examine the issues of denial of due process of law in the courts
of the State of Missouri. The appellant asks that review of appellate court
decision dated 2/9/98 on grounds that the appellate court was (1) That
the Missouri courts lack jurisdiction because they are unable to maintain
an accurate record. (2) The Missouri Courts are biased to the extent that
they deny substantial due process of law. These appellate court issues
presented in its order and memorandum dated 2/9/98 did contradict appellate
and supreme court rulings, and failed to address all the issues presented
in the appellantís brief. The appellant/defendant presents this analysis
for the Supreme Court as follows:
2) The Appellate Court did deny due process of law in the following
instances as presented to the appellant court and incorrectly ruled on.
The trial court is not a court of record because it is unable to keep
and protect an official record. The Appellant Court in its memorandum dated
2/9/98 notes that a court of record is bestowed by statute 476.010 RSMo
without noting that the said statute makes it incumbent on the clerk to
make true and accurate records. The Appellant believes that the Appellant
Court decision is in conflict with Missouri court rulings Barrett V.
Farris, Mo.,, 264 SW 363, 366 , State of Missouri V. West 270 SW 279,
State of Missouri V. Cockwell 217 SW 524, Further, the Missouri Courts
have found the importance of appellant review on a full, fair, and complete
transcript. In Jackson v State of Missouri 514 SW 2nd 532,
as well as State of Missouri v Brown 690 SW 2nd 161.
And that the Appellant Court Memorandum is incorrect in ruling that the
circuit courts of the state of Missouri have no responsibility in the verity
of the official record. The Courtís Clerk Handbook , and the Manual on
Sound Recording Proceedings compiled and maintained by the Court Administratorís
Office have not been followed in this instance, as has been noted in the
appellant brief. Appellant must ask the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri
to transfer and review the Appellant Court decision because the transcript
is not a factual representation of the proceedings before the trial court,
and all noted mistakes does deny a defendant due process. However, if the
Courts of the State of Missouri do want to believe that the record does
meet absolute verity then the appellant/defendant presents the following
documented points that were incorrectly ruled on by the appellant court.
In conclusion, the appellant/defendant
must ask for transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court for a determination
of the due process issues presented in the appellant brief that was incorrectly
cited by the appellate court and the issues, which were never addressed
by the appellate court. Further, the inability of the Courts of the state
of Missouri to provide a record that does speak absolute verity is to deny
any symbol of due process of law and therefore must be reviewed by the
Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.
The Appellant court incorrectly applied State v Davis 903 SW 2d 930,
936, and Barker v. Wingo407 US 514, 530, 92 SCt 2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d
101, in that the criteria set down by the US Supreme Court deals with
the delays caused by the defendantís own motions to prepare for trial.
However, the appellant believes these do contradict RSMo 545.780
in that after a defendant requests a fair and speedy trial and declares
ready trial should be set at the earliest possible date. As noted in State
of Missouri v Hobbs 826 SW 2nd 851, 853, State of Missouri v
Knox 697 SW 2nd 261, 262 . Since the delay of 118 days
was brought on by the trial judge by setting court date according to the
calendar of the public defender who at no time represented the defendant,
can not be attributed to the appellant/defendant and is contrary to the
above citations. And the prejudicial effect of allowing the state to produce
evidence the day before trial that was never presented to the defendant
and was thus ambush does and did deny the defendant due process. The trial
judge should not be a tool of the state, as well the public defender should
never be used as a means to delay justice. For justice delayed is justice
denied, Magna Carta.
The Appellant Court improperly ruled in its memorandum of 2/9/98 that
the proposed jury instruction MAI Ė CR 3 rd 308.16 Belief in Legality
of Conduct is improper. The appellant court noted in the memorandum
that the appellant/ defendant admitted to knowing his license was revoked.
The appellant/ defendant at no time ever testified and any statement as
to knowledge of a revocation of a driverís license on the part of the defendant
is taken out of context, and in violation of Missouri Supreme Court Rule.
Further, to rule that said instruction was improper is in contradiction
to other Missouri court rulings in that State of Missouri v Miller 677
SW2nd 938 specifically states that Belief in Legality of Conduct is
a defense in driving while revoked and at the time the appellant notified
the trial court the issue of the beliefs of the defendant became issues
of fact and the domain to the jury and not the trial judge. State of
Missouri v Horst 729 SW 2nd 30, State of Missouri v Merritt
833 SW 2nd 4.
The Appellate Court memorandum date 2/9/98 incorrectly applied State
of Missouri v. Tyler 440 SW 2nd 470, 474 in that Tyler
decision does not allow any participation by the trial judge in plea agreements
without the representation of the defendant being present, and since the
defendant at no time was represented by anyone other than himself to have
the trial judge knowingly participating in discussions with the prosecuting
attorney and public defender without the presence of the defendant is prohibited
the prejudice to which allowed the defendant to be sentenced for proclaiming
his innocence and not the crime. Mo. S. CT Rule 24.02(d), 37.58, Plunkett
v Plunkett 757 SW 2nd 288, Grant v State of Missouri 700 SW
The Appellant Court failed to address the fact that the trial judge
in opposition to Washington v State of Texas 87 S. CT. 1920, and
490.150, 490.140, did not allow the defendant to attack the credibility
of the Expert witness. David Nanaman.
The Appellate Court failed to address the issue of involving an attorney
,public defenderís office, contrary to RSMo 600.051, Local Rule 21.2,
Faretta v California 95 S. CT. 2525.
The Appellant Court did fail to note the prejudice of failing to impanel
an impartial cross section of the community and misrepresenting a juror
in this case. Art. 1 Sec. 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution provides
for a fair and impartial jury derived from a cross section of the community,
as established by State of Missouri v Williams 659 SW 2nd
778, and U.S. V Potter 552 F 2nd 901, and as to misrepresentation
of a juror Mo. Constitution Art. 1 Sec. 22 (a) , as maintained in
v Kansas City Public Service Co. 211 SW 2nd 459, Lee v Baltimore
Hotel Co. 136 SW 2nd 695, 698, 66 C.J.S. sec 23.
The Appellant Court did fail to address the issue of the state of Missouri
denying the pro se defendant any access to the rules of the court even
after the request of the defendant in violation to the U.S. Constitution
Amendments V, VI, XIV, and Missouri Constitution Art. 1 Sec. 18 (a).
The appellant court did fail to review the appellants brief in the totality,
but rather, chose to view singular points as to prejudice which is contrary
to Glenn Vs State of Missouri 341 F. Supp. 1055.
Lee Allen Martin - Defendant - 3/12/98
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